The subject of the research is a modern graphic and communicative design, in the context of changing existing and forming new roles of communicators, transforming the communication model, forming a semiotic communication format. The object of the research is modern graphic and communicative design, as well as their traditional, digital and generative subdirections. Design beginning to have digital, semiotic-interactive and artificially intelligent characteristics. The author examines in detail such aspects of the topic as: dialogical, semiotic-interactive qualities of design solutions; digital, (...) semiotic-interactive design-software expressive means; features of semiotic-deconstructivity (analyticity) and semiotic-synthetics (constructiveness) of design solutions in the context of design activity; the influence of technical and technological features of tools and design-environments (design systems) for the formation of automated and artificially intelligent qualities of design solutions. The study of the conceptual model of a semiotic-interactive design is carried out in the context of a semiotic-interactive methodology (a set of principles and strategies of design activity). The main conclusions of the study are the description of the conceptual model of a semiotic-interactive design solution, in the context of a semiotic-interactive methodology implemented in the conceptual-generative subdirection of modern graphic and communicative design. The author's main contribution to the research of the topic is to identify the main components of the conceptual model of a semiotic-interactive design solution and demonstrate their relationship with each other in the form of a holistic model. The novelty of the research lies in the description of the characteristics of the components, the conceptual model of a semiotic-interactive design solution: a dialogical semiotic-interactive format for creating invariant concepts and design solutions; versioning of design solutions based on the semiotic synthesis of design programs; semiotic deconstruction of design solutions at the macro and micro levels; semiotic synthesis of design and artistic design programs; application of design programs as decision tools; use of hyperconnected capabilities of the design environment: the history of actions, integrity and continuous change and development. (shrink)

The educational doctrine of The Great Didactic as one of the “grand narratives” suffered its complete setback as a result of events that took place in Paris in 1968. Students stopped believing in the correctness of the entrenched education system with its goals and ideals, and from the inside they “blew up” the “walls” of universities, which continued to follow the traditional teaching methods and content of the learning process. According to the author of this study, the ideological explosion inside (...) the society in the form of a revolutionary riot of students of the Parisian universities in May 1968, who protested against the existing education system as a whole and against the current structure of the relationship between the actors of the educational process, served as a symbolic and actual end of the didactic era of John Amos Comenius and as a beginning of a new poststructuralist didactics. It is important to note that the destruction of the boundaries of the traditional educational space, which led to the emergence of a new type of university, was precisely due to the forces within the classroom curriculum. Today pedagogy is unable autonomously, through its own theories and scientific instruments to determine whom to teach because the student from the subject turns into a subject+, virtually migrating in the cyber-educational space through all sorts of gadgets, which form the prosthetic skeleton of the modern learners - schoolchildren, students. The trajectory of child’s education should not be rigidly determined by curricula and programmes. Teaching in the school should be organized by a teacher on the principle of “ad hoc.”. (shrink)

Using a subclass of the α-maximin expected-utility preference model, in which the decision maker’s degree of ambiguity and degree of pessimism are each parameterized, we present a theory of religious choice in the Pascalian decision theory tradition, one that can resolve dilemmas, address the “many Gods objection,” and address the ambiguity inherent in religious choice. Parameterizing both the degree of ambiguity and the degree of pessimism allows one to examine how the two interact to impact choice, which is useful regardless (...) of the application. Applying this model to religious choice is a move beyond subjective expected-utility theory, allowing us to show that a change in either the degree of ambiguity or the degree of pessimism can lead a decision maker to “convert” from one religion to another. (shrink)

The strength of the ideological explosion of the beginning of the last century, which led to the destruction of the principles of structural-matrix thinking, standard-stereotyped behavior, undoubtedly also reached the education system. However, according to the author’s opinion, the reason for the beginning of transformations in the sphere of education is not an external impact on the education system. External factors of influence, undoubtedly, contributed to the corrosion of the shell of the education system, but the breakthrough of “mantle of (...) education” could occur due to the centrifugal force of the accumulated internal energy. The boundaries of the closed educational space were unable to keep the critical mass of problems accumulated in education. The implosion of education, as one of the most inertial social systems, was inevitable.If the changes that have taken place in the societies of European countries in the New Age, in particular, led to the transition to a new type of university with a new content, while maintaining its old form, the changes that are currently observed, both in the higher and school education, attest to the gradual destruction of the form of educational institutions, their disclosure from within. The evidence of that is cloud schools, flipped classroom, flipped learning, MOOC with its educational resources and teaching methods: Podcast, Vodcast, Pre-Vodcasting. Despite criticism from representatives of the classical educational system, the popularity of modern teaching models continues to grow. (shrink)

We develop an algorithm that can be used to approximate a decisionmaker’s beliefs for a class of preference structures that includes, among others, α-maximin expected utility preferences, Choquet expected utility preferences, and, more generally, constant additive preferences. For both exact and statistical approximation, we demonstrate convergence in an appropriate sense to the true belief structure.

The article examines the phenomenon of conformism in the context of socialist realism, which for a long time was the main direction for the Soviet art sphere. Conformism is interpreted as an effective way for the artist to optimize relations with the authorities and society, giving the opportunity for social self-preservation. Conformism is a kind of strategy for artists, thanks to which they manage to achieve their creative goals and successfully exist within the established cultural framework. The author of the (...) article argues that conformism helped artists who put their creativity at the service of socialist realism to find some basis for their activities, because socialist realism did not initially have such a basis. The author comes to the conclusion that in the conditions of constant transformation of cultural requirements and the need to fully comply with them, conformism becomes for the artist not just a tactic in achieving creative goals, but also a kind of self-defense mechanism that allows to preserve mental and physical health. The most successful Soviet artists were able to realize their talent by creating many bright works of art due to the fact that they created precisely in the mainstream of socialist realism, and if it were not for it, perhaps the world would never have known about some outstanding Soviet artists, as well as not seen their works of art, since the realization of Soviet artists in another cultural environment might well not have taken place. (shrink)

In the article, through the prism of the existential philosophy of S. Kierkegaard, K. Jaspers, G.-G. Gadamer and J.-P. Sartre, as well as the theory of ideology of K. Manheim, the personality of the main character of M. Y. Lermontov's drama "Masquerade" – Arbenin is analyzed. The author of the article claims that Arbenin is in a state of existential despair and finds himself in a borderline situation. At the same time, in the drama "Masquerade", the ideals of Romanticism are (...) reduced to a post-Romantic ideology. Lermontov does this intentionally in order to condemn the ideological perversion of the ideals of romantic culture. The drama also focuses on the general cultural border situation: how to protect yourself from the temptations of ideology at a time when existing ideals and values are disappearing. The author of the article comes to the conclusion that in "Masquerade" Lermontov praises the romantic ideals of rebellious spirit and will, transcendent love and insight, even when he shows the dangers of turning these ideals into ideology. But "Masquerade" is not a romantic drama. This is a drama about romanticism, that is, about how the ideals of romantic culture can be perverted into an ideology that deceives and destroys people, destroying their unique existence, instead of elevating them. "Masquerade" is a variant of Lermontov's reaction to the difficulties that arose in his post–romantic, transitional time. Conveying his admiration for the ideals of romantic culture, Lermontov embodies one of the types of reaction to the realization of the decline of these ideals – the stereotypical reduction of the romantic worldview and values to a set of ideological concepts. But by portraying Arbenin, Lermontov hints at the possibility of recognizing that the worldview and values of Romanticism are losing their authority and integrity and that turning them into an ideology does not compensate for this loss. We need to find a new worldview, new values, new ideals. (shrink)

The article examines the historiosophical reflections of F. I. Tyutchev, presented in his treatises, letters, poems, and substantiates the idea that Tyutchev does not proclaim slogans of either Slavophil or Westernist doctrines, but creates an original imperial ideology. Tyutchev views Russia as an equal and integral part of Europe, linking the existence of the empire with the development of the European spirit in Russia. The main criterion for the existence of the empire is unity. If it does not exist, then (...) the state as an empire cannot exist. Tyutchev treated Orthodoxy as a historiosophical category. He bases his concept of the historical process on the traditions of Eastern Christianity and the legacy of the Byzantine Empire. In the idea of an empire based on Christian principles, Tyutchev sees the best system of statehood. For Tyutchev, the Russian people and Orthodoxy play a major role in the transformation of the world. In the concept of state and power, the categories of Christian ethics are especially important for Tyutchev, which, in his opinion, were not really relevant for the upper strata of society and representatives of the Russian government. The poet calls power "godless", claiming that it does not come from God, but is based on its material power, without recognizing a higher Divine authority over itself. The reason for the "godlessness" of the authorities was the separation from the Russian people and their national traditions and the departure from the historical past of "Holy Russia". This, from Tyutchev's point of view, is the main existential problem of Russia. Tyutchev's concept of empire was not a reproduction of the realities of the political life of Russia in the XIX century, but was an attempt to answer how the state should be built. Tyutchev's ideal of the Russian state is based on a society united by a single Christian faith. (shrink)

The article presents an analysis of the existential paradigm of M. Lermontov's creativity in the light of the existential theories of S. Kierkegaard and K. Jaspers, which is considered in the context of the cultural transition in Russian literature of the 1830s-1840s. It is argued that Lermontov radically changed the nature of his literary activity by the mid-1830s, overcoming his own existential ambivalence and abandoning the subjective emotionality and exoticism of his youthful poetry in favor of objective observations and research (...) of the surrounding world. Lermontov was aware of his existential ambivalence and sought to overcome this state in order to achieve cultural integrity, which should be considered as one of his main values. Lermontov's works reflect the concept of integrity as the integration of culture through a set of prevailing norms and ideals, as well as the feeling that this integrity was disintegrating in transitional times. This state of affairs caused a sense of disintegration in Lermontov, which is similar to the borderline situation of Jaspers. Lermontov's works illustrate the loss of cultural ideals with the decline of Romanticism. But rejecting the ideals of Romanticism, Lermontov conveys the feeling that post-Romantic disappointment generated cynicism and distorted thinking. The novel "The Hero of Our Time" has become the embodiment of such shortcomings. Lermontov's works do not belong to romanticism, nor to protorealism, nor to any combination of both. But Lermontov played his transitional role superbly. Not only did he raise questions about Romanticism that realism would later make its own, he also shed light on Romanticism itself and how it was fading. Lermontov showed how difficult it is for an artist who is aware of his own existential ambivalence to create and live in a transitional time devoid of a unifying sense of cultural integration and integrity, illustrating how badly a creative personality needs such integration and integrity. (shrink)

Social interaction is both ubiquitous and central to understanding human behavior. Such interactions depend, we argue, on shared intentionality: the parties must form a common understanding of an ambiguous interaction (e.g., one person giving a present to another requires that both parties appreciate that a voluntary transfer of ownership is intended). Yet how can shared intentionality arise? Many well-known accounts of social cognition, including those involving “mind-reading,” typically fall into circularity and/or regress. For example, A’s beliefs and behavior may depend (...) on her prediction of B’s beliefs and behavior, but B’s beliefs and behavior depend in turn on her prediction of A’s beliefs and behavior. One possibility is to embrace circularity and take shared intentionality as imposing consistency conditions on beliefs and behavior, but typically there are many possible solutions and no clear criteria for choosing between them. We argue that addressing these challenges requires some form of we-reasoning, but that this raises the puzzle of how the collective agent (the “we”) arises from the individual agents. This puzzle can be solved by proposing that the will of the collective agent arises from a simulated process of bargaining: agents must infer what they would agree, were they able to communicate. This model explains how, and which, shared intentions are formed. We also propose that such “virtual bargaining” may be fundamental to understanding social interactions. (shrink)

Social interaction is both ubiquitous and central to understanding human behavior. Such interactions depend, we argue, on shared intentionality: the parties must form a common understanding of an ambiguous interaction. Yet how can shared intentionality arise? Many well-known accounts of social cognition, including those involving “mind-reading,” typically fall into circularity and/or regress. For example, A’s beliefs and behavior may depend on her prediction of B’s beliefs and behavior, but B’s beliefs and behavior depend in turn on her prediction of A’s (...) beliefs and behavior. One possibility is to embrace circularity and take shared intentionality as imposing consistency conditions on beliefs and behavior, but typically there are many possible solutions and no clear criteria for choosing between them. We argue that addressing these challenges requires some form of we-reasoning, but that this raises the puzzle of how the collective agent arises from the individual agents. This puzzle can be solved by proposing that the will of the collective agent arises from a simulated process of bargaining: agents must infer what they would agree, were they able to communicate. This model explains how, and which, shared intentions are formed. We also propose that such “virtual bargaining” may be fundamental to understanding social interactions. (shrink)

May provides a compelling case that reasoning is central to moral psychology. In practice, many morally significant decisions involve several moral agents whose actions are interdependent – and agents embedded in society. We suggest that social life and the rich patterns of reasoning that underpin it are ethical through and through.

Social interaction is both ubiquitous and central to understanding human behavior. Such interactions depend, we argue, on shared intentionality: the parties must form a common understanding of an ambiguous interaction (e.g., one person giving a present to another requires that both parties appreciate that a voluntary transfer of ownership is intended). Yet how can shared intentionality arise? Many well-known accounts of social cognition, including those involving “mind-reading,” typically fall into circularity and/or regress. For example, A’s beliefs and behavior may depend (...) on her prediction of B’s beliefs and behavior, but B’s beliefs and behavior depend in turn on her prediction of A’s beliefs and behavior. One possibility is to embrace circularity and take shared intentionality as imposing consistency conditions on beliefs and behavior, but typically there are many possible solutions and no clear criteria for choosing between them. We argue that addressing these challenges requires some form of we-reasoning, but that this raises the puzzle of how the collective agent (the “we”) arises from the individual agents. This puzzle can be solved by proposing that the will of the collective agent arises from a simulated process of bargaining: agents must infer what they would agree, were they able to communicate. This model explains how, and which, shared intentions are formed. We also propose that such “virtual bargaining” may be fundamental to understanding social interactions. (shrink)